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Abstract
We deﬁne a probabilistic model for the analysis of a Non-Repudiation protocol that guarantees
fairness, without resorting to a trusted third party, by means of a probabilistic algorithm. By
using the PRISM model checker, we estimate the probability for a malicious user to break the
non-repudiation property, depending on various parameters of the protocol.
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1 Introduction
Repudiation is deﬁned as denial by one of the entities involved in a communi-
cation of having participated in all or part of the communication. One speaks
of repudiation of the origin if the originator of a message denies having sent
the message, and of repudiation of receipt if the recipient of the message denies
having received the message.
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Protocols have been deﬁned which ensure non-repudiation by making use of
a trusted third party in the communication. Protocols involving no third party
have been proposed in fault-less scenarios. Markowitch and Roggeman [13]
give a probabilistic protocol which achieves fair non-repudiation services with-
out the need of a third party and without further assumptions. In particular,
the probabilistic protocol is fair up to a given tolerance ε. This tolerance
depends on the values chosen for various parameters of the protocol.
In [2], the protocol is described by means of a probabilistic process alge-
bra and analyzed, in an untimed setting, through a notion of probabilistic
weak bisimulation. In previous work [12] we have described the protocol by
using Probabilistic Timed Systems and bisimulation for Probabilistic Timed
Systems, in order to show fairness up to a given tolerance. In this paper
we translate the Probabilistic Timed Systems modelling the protocol, into
PRISM speciﬁcations [1], in order to estimate how the tolerance varies when
the parameters of the protocol are varied.
In section 2 we describe the non-repudiation protocol, in section 3 we
recall Probabilistic Timed Systems, in section 4 we use the Probabilistic Timed
Systems to model the protocol, in section 5 we translate our model into PRISM
speciﬁcations, in section 6 we show the results obtained by running the PRISM
model checker.
2 A Probabilistic Non-Repudiation Protocol
In this section we describe a protocol that guarantees a non-repudiation service
with a certain probability without resorting to a trusted third party [13]. In
particular, such a probabilistic protocol is fair up to a given tolerance ε decided
by the originator. Assume that an authentication phase precedes the protocol.
We denote by SignE(M) the encryption of message M under the private key
of the entity E and with {M}K the encryption of M under the key K. Finally,
we use t to denote a time stamp. The protocol can be described as follows
(with the notation R → O : Msg we denote a message Msg sent by R and
received by O):
1. R → O : SignR(request, R,O, t)
2. O → R : SignO({M}K , O,R, t) (= M1)
3. R → O : SignR(ack1)
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4.
a.1−p O → R : SignO(Mr, O,R, t) (= Mi)
R → O : SignR(acki)
goto step 4
b.p O → R : SignO(K,O,R, t) (= Mn)
5. R → O : SignR(ackn)
The recipient R starts the protocol by sending a signed, timestamped re-
quest to the originator O. This sends to R the requested message M ciphered
under the key K, and waits for the ack from R (acki represents the acknowl-
edgment related to message Mi). At step 4 the originator makes a probabilistic
choice according to p = ε. At step 4a (taken with probability 1− p) O sends
to R a random message Mr (i.e. a dummy key), receives the ack and returns
to step 4, while at step 4b (taken with probability p) O sends to R the key
K necessary to decrypt the message {M}K . Upon reception of the last ack
(ackn), related to the message containing the key K, the originator terminates
the protocol correctly. We suppose that each acki message carries the follow-
ing semantics: ”R acknowledges having received message Mi from O”. This
could be easily obtained, for instance, by assuming that each acki message
contains an hash of message Mi.
Intuitively, the non-repudiation of origin is guaranteed by the messages
M1 and Mn (signed with the private key of O), while the non repudiation of
receipt is given by the last message SignR(ackn). If the protocol terminates
after the delivery of the last ack, both parties obtain their expected informa-
tion, and the protocol is fair. If the protocol terminates before sending the
message containing the key K, then neither the originator nor the recipient
obtains any valuable information, thus preserving fairness. A strategy for a
dishonest recipient consists in guessing the last message containing the key
K, verifying whether a received message contains the needed key and then
blocking the transmission of the last ack. Therefore, for the success of the
protocol, it is necessary that the ack messages are sent back immediatly. The
originator decides a deadline for the reception of each ack, after which, if
the ack is not received, the protocol is stopped. Obviously, the cryptosystem
must be adequately chosen, in such a way that the time needed to verify a
key, by deciphering the message, is longer than the transmission time of an
ack message. Anyway, a malicious recipient can try to randomly guess the
message containing the key K, and in this case the probability for the recip-
ient of guessing the last message depends on the parameter p chosen by the
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originator.
3 Probabilistic Timed System
We give a deﬁnition of Probabilistic Timed Systems as a subclass of Proba-
bilistic Timed Automata [5,10,3,11], assuming discrete time domain. Let us
assume a set X of integer variables, with a subset Y of variables called clocks.
A valuation over X is a mapping v : X → Z assigning natural values to clocks
and integer values to variables in X \ Y . For a valuation v and a time value
t ∈ N, let v + t denote the valuation such that (v + t)(x) = v(x), for each
integer variable x ∈ X \Y , and (v+t)(y) = v(y)+t, for each clock y ∈ Y . The
set of constraints over X, denoted Φ(X), is deﬁned by the following grammar,
where φ ranges over Φ(X), x ∈ X, c ∈ Z and ∼∈ {<,≤,=, =, >,≥}:
φ ::= x ∼ c |φ ∧ φ | ¬φ |φ∨ φ | true
We write v |= φ when the valuation v satisﬁes the constraint φ. Formally,
v |= x ∼ c iﬀ v(x) ∼ c, v |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iﬀ v |= φ1 and v |= φ2, v |= ¬φ iﬀ v |= φ,
v |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iﬀ v |= φ1 or v |= φ2, and v |= true.
An assignment over X is a set of expressions either of the form x′ = c or
of the form x′ = y + c, where x, y ∈ X and c ∈ Z.
With Ass(X) we denote the set of sets of assignments {x′1 = ρ1, . . . , x′n =
ρn} such that xi ∈ X and xi = xj , for any i = j.
Let B ∈ Ass(X); with v[B] we denote the valuation resulting after the as-
signments in B. More precisely, v[B](x) = c if x′ = c is in B, v[B](x) = v(y)+c
if x′ = y + c is in B, and v[B](x) = v(x), otherwise.
A Probabilistic Timed System A is a tuple (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, γ, π), where:
• Σ is a ﬁnite alphabet of actions. With τ ∈ Σ we denote the silent or internal
action.
• X is a ﬁnite set of variables with a subset Y of clocks.
• Q is a ﬁnite set of states and q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
• δ ⊆ Q × Σ × Φ(X) × Ass(X) × Q is a ﬁnite set of transitions. With
δ(q), we denote the set of transitions starting from state q. More precisely,
δ(q) = {(q1, α, φ, B, q2) ∈ δ | q1 = q}.
• γ is an interval function such that for each e = (q1, α, φ, B, q2) ∈ δ, it holds
that γ(e) is a closed interval of naturals. With |γ(e)| we denote the natural
value u − l + 1, where γ(e) = [l, u]. Intuitively, γ(e) represents an interval
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of time within which the time t when the transition e will be performed
is probabilistically chosen. It must also hold that the constraint φ is true
during the interval γ(e).
• π is a probability function such that for each state q and transition e ∈ δ(q),
it holds that π(e)· 1|γ(e)| is the probability of performing the transition e from
state q in a generic time t in γ(e). Hence, we have a uniform distribution
for time t, since for each time t ∈ γ(e) the probability is ﬁxed to π(e) · 1|γ(e)| .
Therefore we require that for each state q it holds that
∑
e∈δ(q) π(e) ∈ {0, 1}.
A conﬁguration of A is a pair (q, v), where q ∈ Q is a state of A, and v is
a valuation over X. The set of all the conﬁgurations of A is denoted with SA.
There is a step from a conﬁguration s1 = (q1, v1) to a conﬁguration s2 =
(q2, v2) through action a ∈ Σ, after t ∈ N time units, written s1 (a,t)−−→ s2, if there
is a transition e = (q1, a, φ, B, q2) ∈ δ such that (v1 + t) |= φ, v2 = (v1 + t)[B]
and t ∈ γ(e). With prob(s1 (a,t)−−→ s2) we denote the probability
∑
e∈E π(e)· 1|γ(e)| ,
where E is the set of transitions that could have triggered the step s1
(a,t)−−→ s2,
namely the set {e = (q1, a, φ, B, q2) ∈ δ | (v1 + t) |= φ ∧ v2 = (v1 + t)[B] ∧ t ∈
γ(e)}.
If s is a conﬁguration, then with Adm(s) we denote the set of steps
s
(a,t)−−→ s′. The conﬁguration s is called terminal iﬀ Adm(s) = ∅.
An execution fragment starting from s0 is a ﬁnite sequence of steps σ =
s0
(a1,t1)−−−→ s1 (a2,t2)−−−→ s2 (a3,t3)−−−→ . . . (ak ,tk)−−−−→ sk such that s0, s1, . . . , sk ∈ SA,
a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Σ. We deﬁne last(σ) = sk, |σ| = k and σj the sequence of
steps s0
(a1,t1)−−−→ s1 (a2,t2)−−−→ . . . (aj ,tj)−−−→ sj, where j ≤ k. Moreover we deﬁne the
following probability
P (σ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if k = 0
P (σk−1) · prob(sk−1
(ak,tk)−−−−→sk)P
g∈Adm(sk−1) prob(g)
if k > 0
.
The execution fragment σ is called maximal iﬀ last(σ) is terminal. We
denote with ExecFrag(s) the set of execution fragments starting from s.
An execution is either a maximal execution fragment or an inﬁnite sequence
s0
(a1,t1)−−−→ s1 (a2,t2)−−−→ . . ., where s0, s1 . . . ∈ SA, a1, a2, . . . ∈ Σ. We denote with
Exec(s) the set of executions starting from s. Finally, let σ ↑ denote the
set of executions σ′ such that σ ≤prefix σ′, where preﬁx is the usual preﬁx
relation over sequences. Assuming the basic notions of probability theory (see
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e.g. [7]), we deﬁne the probability space on the executions starting in a given
conﬁguration s ∈ SA as follows. Let Exec(s) be the set of executions starting
in s, ExecFrag(s) be the set of execution fragments starting in s, and ΣF (s)
be the smallest sigma ﬁeld on Exec(S) that contains the basic cylinders σ ↑,
where σ ∈ ExecFrag(s). The probability measure Prob is the unique measure
on ΣF (s) such that Prob(σ ↑) = P (σ).
3.1 Parallel composition
Given two probabilistic timed systems A1 and A2, and given the set L = ΣA1∩
ΣA2 , where ΣAi is the set of actions of the system Ai, we deﬁne the parallel
composition of A1 and A2, denoted A1||pA2, where p ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, p
represents the diﬀerent advancing speeds for the two systems. The set of states
of A1||pA2 is given by the cartesian product of the states of the two systems
A1 and A2. Given a state (r, q) of A1||pA2, the set of transitions starting from
(r, q) is obtained by the following rules:
• If from state r the system A1 has a transition e = (r, a, φ, B, r′) with action
a ∈ L and probability p′, A1||pA2 has a transition ((r, q), a, φ, B, (r′, q)) with
probability p · p′ and interval γ(e).
• If from state q the system A2 has a transition e = (q, a, φ, B, q′) with action
a ∈ L and probability p′, A1||pA2 has a transition ((r, q), a, φ, B, (r, q′)) with
probability (1− p) · p′ and interval γ(e).
• If from state r the system A1 has a transition e = (r, a, φ1, B1, r′) with action
a ∈ L and probability p′, and from state q the system A2 has a transition
e′ = (q, a, φ2, B2, q′) with probability p′′ and B1∪B2 ∈ Ass(X), then A1 and
A2 synchronize and A1||pA2 has a transition ((r, q), a, φ1∧φ2, B1∪B2, (r′, q′))
with probability p · p′ + (1− p) · p′′ and interval γ(e) ∩ γ(e′).
When we omit parameter p from the composition operator we assume the two
systems to have the same advancing speeds, and hence p equal to 1
2
.
4 Modelling the Non-Repudiation Protocol with Prob-
abilistic Timed Systems
In this section we use the model of Probabilistic Timed Systems to formally
describe the protocol seen in section 2. When no constraint is put on a transi-
tion we assume that it will be taken instantly. Moreover, if for the transition
starting from a certain state q we omit probabilities, then the transitions with
source q are equiprobable. Hence, if a state has only one transition e, then
π(e) = 1, and, if a state has two transitions e and e′, then π(e) = π(e′) = 1
2
.
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Fig. 1. Representation of Orig
We start with introducing the Probabilistic Timed Systems modelling an orig-
inator and a recipient behaving correctly. The originator (ﬁgure 1) is always
ready to start a communication by accepting a request, sending the ﬁrst mes-
sage containing M encrypted with K (action firstmes) and receiving the ﬁrst
ack (see steps 1, 2 and 3 of the protocol in section 2). Then, in state q3, with
probability 1−p, it sends a random message reaching state q2 and, with prob-
ability p, sends the last message containing K, sets the variable l to 1, and
reaches state q4 (step 4 of the protocol). We do not model value passing, hence
we simply call all these actions message. In state q2 the reception of the ack
message is modelled by the input action ack, while the expiration of the dead-
line (represented by the constant AD) is modelled by the action stop executed
when the clock x assumes a value greater than AD. The fair termination of
the protocol is reached when the originator receives the last ack (step 5 of the
protocol) and performs the action correctstop. The protocol terminates in an
unfair way if and only if the originator does not receive the ack related to the
message containing K, and in such a case it executes the action unfair. The
constants ad and AD used in the constraints of the ack transitions, represent
an estimation of the minimum and maximum transmission delay of an ack
message, respectively. In particular, we assume that an ack, sent within the
net, will always arrive at destination in time t such that ad ≤ t ≤ AD.
We modeled the actions request, firstmes, and message as instant ac-
tions, since the time needed for the transmission of such messages in the
network is not interesting in our analysis.
In ﬁgure 2, we show the system representing a recipient that behaves cor-
rectly. The recipient starts the protocol by sending a request, receives the
ﬁrst message, sends the ﬁrst ack and reaches state r3, from where, whenever
it receives a message, it sends an ack back. The protocol terminates when the
input action correctstop is executed.
The whole system representing the protocol is deﬁned as Orig||HRecip,
where originator and recipient synchronize through actions in the set L =
{request, firstmes, ack,message, correctstop}.
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The protocol ends in a fair correct way when the action correctstop is
performed, i.e. when the system reaches the state (q0, r5). In particular, if
both participants behave correctly, the unfair behavior cannot be executed;
instead, it is possible to ﬁnd a malicious recipient that receives the expected
information and denies sending the ﬁnal ack.
In ﬁgure 3 we show the system representing a malicious recipient that
maximizes the probability of guessing the last message of the protocol (we
assume that it knows the probability distribution chosen by the originator).
It follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter q to decide either to send
the ack message (transition τ from state r4 to state r6) or to try to compute
M by employing the last received message (transition from state r4 to state
r5). We assume that the time necessary to decipher the message is within the
interval [dd,DD]. Note that if ad + dd < AD the recipient can send an ack
even after failing to decipher the message (see transition from r5 to r6). So
the originator should take care of the protocol parameters ad, AD, dd and
DD. State r7 represents, instead, the state reached by the malicious recipient
when correctly guessing the last message. Since we set the variable l to 1 when
the originator sends the last message, the malicious recipient succeeds in its
strategy when in state r5 such a variable has value 1 reaching the ﬁnal state
r7. On the other hand, if variable l has value 0, the malicious recipient goes
to state r6, from which it tries to send the ack back.
The probability of executing the action unfair for the system Orig||HRecip
is equal to 0, while the probability of executing it for the system Orig||MRecip
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is (as ad + dd > AD):
z = p · q ·
∞∑
i=0
((1− p) · (1− q))i = p · q
1− (1− p) · (1− q) .
Given 0 < p ≤ 1 chosen by the originator and 0 < q ≤ 1, the maximum value
for z is p, obtained by taking q = 1. The recipient model, which optimizes
the probability of violating the fairness condition, is obtained by removing the
transition labelled with τ from state r4 to state r6.
4.1 The case of slow networks
As we have seen the probability for the malicious user to break the protocol
is always smaller than p, which is a parameter decided by the designer of the
protocol. This happens, obviously, when the condition ad + dd > AD holds.
In such a case, in fact, the malicious user could only try to decrypt the ﬁrst
message with the last received one as key (risking in this case to stop the
protocol), or send an ack to the originator.
On the other hand, the condition above holds only if the time needed
to send/receive an ack within the network is smaller than the time needed
to decrypt a message within a given cryptosystem. Could we still use the
protocol with a reasonable margin of risk in a network where the maximum
acknowledgement delay time is bigger than the maximum decryption time,
or in a network that is frequently subject to congestion? If the condition
ad + dd > AD does not hold, in fact, the malicious user could try to send an
ack to the originator even after trying to decrypt the last received message.
We are interested in analyzing how the probability of breaking the protocol
fairness increases when operating with a network with a long round trip time
(high values for parameter AD), and in networks that are frequently subject
to congestions (high values for the length of the interval [ad, AD]).
5 The PRISM tool
PRISM [1] is a probabilistic model checker that allows modeling and analyz-
ing systems which exhibit a probabilistic behavior. Given a description of
the system to be modelled, PRISM constructs a probabilistic model that can
be either a discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC), a Markov decision process
(MDP), or a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) [9]. On the constructed
model PRISM can check properties speciﬁed by using a temporal logic (PCTL
for DTMCs and MDPs, and CSL for CTMCs).
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A system in PRISM is composed of modules and variables. A module has
local variables and its behavior is expressed by commands of the form:
[sym] g → λ1 : u1 + · · ·+ λn : un
where sym is the synchronization symbol, g is a guard on all the variables in
the system, and ui is a set of updates on local variables. The constant λi is
the probability of performing the update ui. Constraints can be of the form
x ∼ c, where c is a natural and x a variable of the whole system. Updates
are expressed by using primed variables; as an example x′ = 0 represents the
reset to 0 of variable x.
Since we used the model of DTMC, we use the PCTL speciﬁcation lan-
guage [8,6,4] to specify properties of systems.
The syntax of PCTL is given by the following grammar:
φ ::= true | false | a | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | ¬φ | P∼p[ψ]
ψ ::= Xφ | φU≤kφ | φUφ
where a is an atomic proposition, ∼∈ {<,≤,≥, >} is a relational operator,
p ∈ [0, 1] is a probability, and k is an integer.
An atomic proposition a is satisﬁed or not by a given state of a Proba-
bilistic Timed System. Symbol X denotes the “next state operator”, symbol
U denotes the “until” operator, and U≤k denotes the “bounded until” (i.e.
within k steps) operator. Intuitively, φ1Uφ2 is satisﬁed when the formula φ1
holds until φ2 holds; φ1U≤kφ2 is satisﬁed if φ2 becomes true within k steps.
Moreover, P∼p[ψ] is satisﬁed by a given set of computations iﬀ the overall
probability p′ of the computations satisfying ψ is such that p′ ∼ p.
5.1 Modeling the Non-Repudiation Protocol in PRISM
In this section we show the PRISM description of the systems introduced in
section 4, and the results of some properties veriﬁed on such models 4 .
5.1.1 Honest Recipient
In ﬁgure 4 we show the PRISM code of the modules representing the originator
(Orig) and an honest recipient (HRecip). A third module (AckDel) is used
for modelling the probability distribution of the variable t representing the
acknowledgement delay. We decided to use a uniform probability distribution
for the variable t. So, given the random variable t that can range in the
4 Tests are done on a 1,15GHz AMD Athlon PC with Linux OS and 512 MB of RAM.
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interval [ad,AD], we have that:
∀k ∈ [ad, AD] p(t = k) = 1
AD− ad+ 1 ,
where p(t = k) represents the probability that variable t assumes value k.
The constant p1 used in the Orig module represents the probability p used
in the Probabilistic Timed System Orig seen in section 4.
probabilistic
const AD = 3;
const ad = 1;
rate p1 = 0.001;
rate u1 = 1/(1+AD-ad);
module Orig
q : [0..6];
l : [0..1];
[request] (q=0)&(r=0) -> (q’=1);
[firstmes] (q=1)&(r=1) -> (q’=2);
[ack_r] (q=2)&(a=2)&(t<=AD) -> (q’=3);
[stop] (q=2)&(t>AD) -> (q’=0);
[message] (q=3)&(r=3) -> p1:(q’=4)&(l’=1) + (1-p1):(q’=2);
[ack_r] (q=4)&(a=2)&(t<=AD) -> (q’=5);
[unfair] (q=4)&(t>AD) -> (q’=6);
[correctstop] (q=5)&(r=3) -> (q’=0);
endmodule
module HRecip
r : [0..5];
[request] (r=0)&(q=0) -> (r’=1);
[firstmes] (r=1)&(q=1) -> (r’=2);
[ack_s] (r=2)&(a=0) -> (r’=3);
[message] (r=3)&(q=3) -> (r’=4);
[ack_s] (r=4)&(a=0) -> (r’=3);
[correctstop] (r=3)&(q=5) -> (r’=5);
endmodule
module AckDel
a: [0..2];
t: [0..AD];
[ack_s] (a=0)&((r=2)|(r=4)) -> (a’=1);
[] (a=1) -> u1:(a’=2)&(t’=1) + u1:(a’=2)&(t’=2) + u1:(a’=2)&(t’=3);
[ack_r] (a=2)&((q=2)|(q=4)) -> (a’=0);
endmodule
Fig. 4. Orig + HRecip
Given the above participants, the protocol always ends in a fair correct
way. When the protocol ends in a fair way, the recipient state variable r
assumes value 5. As a consequence, we can verify that the protocol always
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ends in a fair way by simply checking the property:
P≥1[true U (r = 5)].
The model checking for the above property took 0,004 seconds, giving as result
that the property is true in all the states of the model.
5.1.2 Malicious Recipient
In ﬁgure 5 we show the PRISM code of the modules representing the originator
(Orig) and a malicious recipient (MRecip). As in the previous case, a third
module (AckDel) is used for modelling the uniform probability distribution
of the variable t representing the acknowledgement delay. Also the random
variable x, used in the module MRecip and representing the time needed to
decrypt a message, follows a uniform distribution with range [dd,DD]. The
constant q1 used in the MRecip module represents the probability q used in
the Probabilistic Timed System MRecip seen in section 4.
6 Experimental Results
Setting : set a set b set c set d
ad 10 1 1 1
AD 13 4 12 12
dd 14 1 1 1
DD 15 5 2 2
p1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.001
Table 1
We studied the probability for a malicious user of breaking the fairness of the
non-repudiation for several settings of our model parameters. More precisely
in the settings set a, set b, set c and set d, we studied the probability of
breaking the protocol fairness as a parameter of the value of q1, assuming
various values for the constants ad, AD, dd, DD and p1 (see table 1). Since the
malicious user’s state variable r assumes value 7 when it successfully gets its
information without sending the last ack, the properties we used in order to
estimate the probability of breaking the protocol fairness are of the form:
P≥v[true U (r = 7)].
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probabilistic
const AD = 3;
const ad = 1;
const DD = 2;
const dd = 1;
rate p1 = 0.001;
rate q1 = 1;
rate u1 = 1/(1+AD-ad);
rate v1 = 1/(1+DD-dd);
module Orig
q : [0..6];
l : [0..1];
[request] (q=0)&(r=0) -> (q’=1);
[firstmes] (q=1)&(r=1) -> (q’=2);
[ack_r] (q=2)&(a=2)&(t+x<=AD) -> (q’=3);
[stop] (q=2)&(t+x>AD) -> (q’=0);
[message] (q=3)&(r=3) -> p1:(q’=4)&(l’=1) + (1-p1):(q’=2);
[ack_r] (q=4)&(a=2)&(t+x<=AD) -> (q’=5);
[unfair] (q=4)&(r=7) -> (q’=6);
[correctstop] (q=5)&(r=3) -> (q’=0);
endmodule
module MRecip
r : [0..8];
x : [0..DD];
[request] (r=0)&(q=0) -> (r’=1);
[firstmes] (r=1)&(q=1) -> (r’=2);
[ack_s] (r=2)&(a=0) -> (r’=3);
[message] (r=3)&(q=3) -> (r’=4);
[] (r=4) -> q1:(r’=5) + (1-q1):(r’=6)&(x’=0);
[] (r=5)&(l=0) -> v1:(r’=6)&(x’=1) + v1:(r’=6)&(x’=2);
[won] (r=5)&(l=1) -> (r’=7);
[ack_s] (r=6)&(a=0) -> (r’=3);
[correctstop] (r=3)&(q=5) -> (r’=8);
endmodule
module AckDel
a : [0..2];
t : [ad..AD];
[ack_s] (a=0)&((r=2)|(r=6)) -> (a’=1);
[] (a=1) -> u1:(a’=2)&(t’=1) + u1:(a’=2)&(t’=2) + u1:(a’=2)&(t’=3);
[ack_r] (a=2)&((q=2)|(q=4)) -> (a’=0);
endmodule
Fig. 5. Orig + MRecip
So we can approximate to v the probability of breaking the protocol when the
property P≥v[true U (r = 7)] is satisﬁed by the initial state of the model, and
the property P≥v+ε[true U (r = 7)] is not, with ε a small value. The checking
procedure of a property of the above type always took less then half a second.
Figures 6, 7 and 8 show the probability of breaking the protocol fairness
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Fig. 6. Varying q1 in an ideal network.
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Fig. 7. Varying q1 in slow networks.
as a function of q1 for the parameter settings in table 1.
In the set a setting, we have that ad+dd > AD. In such a case the malicious
recipient could not send an ack after trying to decrypt the ﬁrst message using
the last received one as key, and so the probability of breaking the protocol
fairness, shown in ﬁgure 6, is given by the formula p1·q1
1−(1−p1)·(1−q1) . As we have
seen, the maximum value for this probability is represented by the parameter
p1.
In the set b, set c and set d settings we have, instead, that ad+ dd ≤ AD.
With these three settings we propose a ﬁrst analysis of the case of slow net-
works described in section 4.1. In such a case, as can be seen from ﬁgures 7
and 8, we have that the probability of breaking the protocol fairness increases
as q1 goes to 1 and reaches also values that are bigger than p1.
In the settings e,f,g, we studied the probability of breaking the protocol
fairness as a parameter of the value of AD, assuming various values for the
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Fig. 8. Varying q1 in a slow network, given a low p1.
Setting : set e set f set g
ad 1 1 1
dd 1 1 1
DD 4 4 4
p1 0.001 0.01 0.1
q1 1 1 1
Table 2
constants ad, dd, DD and p1 (see Tab. 2).
Figure 9 shows the probability of breaking the protocol fairness as a func-
tion of AD for the parameter settings in Table 2. In particular those settings
model the case of “slow and congestioned network” described in section 4.1.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1  10  100  1000  10000  100000
AD
"set_e"
"set_f"
"set_g"
Fig. 9. Analysis of congestioned networks.
R. Lanotte et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 112 (2005) 113–129 127
Obviously, as AD increases, also the probability of breaking the non-repudiation
protocol increases. But, as it can be seen from ﬁgure 9, with a small value
of p1, the protocol could be reasonably used also in the case when the time
needed to send an ack is bigger than the time needed to decrypt a message.
7 Conclusions
We have given a model of the non-repudiation protocol proposed by Markow-
itch and Roggeman [13], and we studied the probability that the protocol
achieves fair non-repudiation by varying parameters of the protocol. In par-
ticular, we analyzed the case when the protocol is run in networks with a long
round trip time.
An important implementation detail when constructing our PRISM models
regards the choice of how the probabilistic time variable t is modeled. When
it was reasonably feasible we simply listed all the possible values that t could
assume. We did this for the cases modeled with the speciﬁcations given in
set a, set b, set c and set d, expressing the list in the second transition of
the AckDel modules. Since the parameter t assumed extremely large values
in the tests involving the speciﬁcations of set e, set f and set g (according to
the parameter AD), it was practically infeasible to list all the values that t
could assume. However, since in these latter cases the time needed to decrypt
a message is assumed to be in the interval [1, 4], the only interesting values
for t are AD, AD − 1, . . . , AD − 3. For any other value of t contained in the
interval [ad, AD− 4], the malicious user succeeds in its attempt to decrypt the
message and then to send the ack (in this case, in fact, t+ x is always equal
or smaller than AD). For this reasons, we simply used the following transition
in the module AckDel:
[] (a=1) -> u1*(AD-ad-3):(a’=2)&(t’=ad) +
+ u1:(a’=2)&(t’=AD-3) + u1:(a’=2)&(t’=AD-2) + u1:(a’=2)&(t’=AD-1) + u1:(a’=2)&(t’=AD);.
Hence, the ﬁrst update (concerning all the cases when t ∈ [ad, AD− 4]) is
taken with probability u1 ·(AD−ad−3), while all the other interesting updates
are taken with probability u1.
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